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This paper presents a sequential model suited to analyze transitions between equi-
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response to shocks crucially depends on the institutional features of the economy, and
on the monetary policy stance. In particular, some degree of wage stickiness proves
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1 Introduction
This paper develops a sequential macroeconomic model that allows to study the character-
istics of transitions between equilibria. Most of the times, economic analysis is carried out
by comparison of steady states (or of regular growth paths). Transitional (or out-of-steady-
state) dynamics are thus neglected because inherently short term phenomena, and because
they are pre-determined from the beginning, and as such not particularly informative (think
for instance of the saddle path adjustment in standard growth theory). The main point of this
paper, instead, is that the transition may be interesting to the economist because, far from
being pre-determined, it is shaped by the interaction of agent’s behaviour, institutional fac-
tors, and environmental characteristics. Furthermore, during these transitions disequilibria
appear in at least some markets, and adjustments may have permanent eﬀects. This ap-
proach, while it constitutes no substitute of standard equilibrium analysis, may complement
it and give interesting insights on both theoretical and empirical grounds, while delivering
policy prescriptions.
The baseline model is a standard monopolistic competition model, similar to those de-
veloped by the New-Keynesian literature (e.g. Woodford 2003), in which I introduce four
diﬀerent hypotheses:
• Production takes time, and is often characterized by complementarity rather than sub-
stitutability in the factors. The final goods sector uses capital (produced one period
earlier) and labour, with a Leontief production function; further assumptions make
this representation analytically equivalent to vertically integrated sector, in which la-
bor is inputted first in construction and then in utilization of productive capacity (as
in Hicks, 1973).
• Agents have bounded rationality, especially when facing complex environments.
• No variable may move instantaneously. In particular, I reverse the speed of adjustment
of prices and quantities in response to disequilibria. As in the early Postkeynesians
(Clower, 1965; Leijonhufvud, 1968) or in temporary equilibrium models (Hicks, 1939;
Malinvaud, 1977; Benassy, 1982), prices only adjust between periods. In addition, in
this model ex-ante disequilibria (i.e. inconsistency of agent’s plans) within the period
are eliminated by rationing and stock accumulation rather than by price adjustments.
• Finally, agents are constrained, in their transactions, by financial availability. This sort
of cash-in-advance constraint emerges because markets open sequentially.
These hypotheses have all been extensively used in the literature. But, to the best of
my knowledge, never jointly. It is easy to see why they are relevant when we are interested
in the transition between equilibria: each period begins with state variables determined in
the previous one, and with imbalances that constrain agents in their subsequent decisions.
Expectations and the structure of productive capacity further link the periods in a sequence.
As a consequence, it is impossible to consider each period in isolation, as for example in the
temporary equilibrium literature. A shock (no matter of what type) disrupts the coordina-
tion between agents and between phases of production that characterizes equilibrium. The
“success” of the subsequent transition lies in the ability of the system in recovering coordina-
tion; and in this respect, both the role of monetary policy and the institutional wage setting
environment prove crucial. In particular, it will turn out that some degree of wage stickiness
may be desirable as a means for dampening disequilibrium fluctuations.
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This paper mainly relates to three streams of literature. The first is the New Keynesian
literature that is progressively becoming the reference model, especially for the analysis of
monetary policy (Gali, 2002; Woodford, 2003). I share with these models the reference to a
monopolistic competition sticky prices environment, even if I have no reference to forward
looking Calvo (1983) pricing; more importantly, my focus is on disequilibrium dynamics,
whereas these papers see fluctuations as equilibrium (technology induced) phenomena like in
the RBC literature. I share with the temporary equilibrium literature the fix-price hypothesis,
and the possibility of rationing; but by releasing the hypothesis of full rationality, in my model
I have to deal with the appearance of unsold stocks1, that enrich the model by linking the
periods in a sequence, even if at the price of notable complication. Finally the stream I am
most related to is the Neoaustrian approach, developed by Hicks (1970, 1973) and Amendola
and Gaﬀard (1998). Like them I emphasize the temporal articulation of production, and
the irreversibilities linked mainly (but not only) to capital accumulation. On the other hand,
this paper abandons the Hicksian representation of technology, and substitutes it with a
standard CES production function and time to build. In general, I make an attempt to
provide microfoundations to some of the Neoaustrian hypotheses, and to relate this type of
work to the mainstream literature.
The outline of the paper is as follows: section 2 will lay down the benchmark model; the
following section will show that each taken in isolation, complementarity, adaptive behaviour,
time to build and a temporary equilibrium structure do not aﬀect the behaviour of the model
other than in the short run. Section 4, introduces the hypotheses jointly, together with the
intraperiod sequencing of events. Section 5 describes, by means of simulations, the behaviour
of the economy when hit by nominal or real shocks. The analysis focusses in particular on the
most appropriate wage regime and monetary policy stance. Finally, section 6 shows how this
model may be appropriate to reappraise Keynes’ intuition about wages and unemployment,
and concludes.
2 The Benchmark Model
Consider an economy in which each of N final goods is produced by a monopolist, using
capital and labour hired on perfectly competitive markets. Money is the numeraire, and is
used for transactions.
Consumers The H consumers maximize a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) utility function in
leisure and in the basket of goods. As their choice is made within each period, and there
is no savings, the time subscript t can be omitted.
max
c,y
uh = c1−ah V
a
h 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, h = 1...H
s.t. Vh =
Ã
NX
n=1
y(b−1)/bn,h
!b/(b−1)
b > 1 (1)
NX
n=1
pnyn,h + wch = Ih
1Bounded rationality is not the only reason why stocks could appear. Another one could be missing
information due for example to stochastic rationing (I owe this remark to Gerd Weinrich).
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where ch ≡ 1 − lsh. Assuming that the endowment of labour is 1, total per capita income is
equal to Ih ≡ (w + d), where d is dividend to be defined below. Maximization yields
ydn,h = a
³pn
P
´−b Ih
P
with P 1−b ≡
X
n
p1−bn (2a)
lsh ≡ 1− ch = 1−
(1− a)Ih
w
(2b)
Production The production function and the associated cost function are CES:
yn = [(αlly,n)
ρ + (αkkn)
ρ]1/ρ n = 1, ..., N (3a)
c(yn, w, pk) = yn
h³
w
αl
´σ
+
³
pk
αk
´σi1/σ
σ ≡ ρ/(ρ− 1) (3b)
where pk is the price of capital (that is assumed to completely depreciate at each period).
Notice that all monopolists use the same technology and have access to the same capital
and labour markets. As a consequence, αl, αk, w, pk are not indexed by n. Each monopolist
maximizes the expected sum of future profits:
max
p
E0
∞X
t=0
δt (pn,tyn,t − c(yn,t))
(4)
s.t yn,t = Ha
µ
pn,t
Pt
¶−b Ih,t
Pt
In this benchmark case everything is contemporaneous2, so that the solution to this program
boils down to a standard markup equation,
pn = βc0(yn), (5)
where β ≡ b/(b− 1) > 1 is the markup.
Capital Market In the capital market, technology is linear, and perfect competition
equates price and marginal cost,
kn = γlk,n
(6)
pk =
w
γ
This simple formulation, and the assumption that capital markets are always in equilibrium,
de facto make the capital redundant. This is simply a labour economy, not too diﬀerent from
a standard New Keynesian one (e.g. Woodford, 2003)3. Later on, when adding time to build,
we’ll have production as a function of dated labour, similarly to what happens in Wicksell
(1898), Hicks (1970, 1973), and Amendola and Gaﬀard (1998).
2In section 4 the recursive structure of the model will allow to focus on two period problems.
3The production function can in fact be written as y = [(αlly)
ρ + (αkγlk)
ρ]1/ρ.
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Equilibrium The fact that all firms utilize the same technology, and face the same
factor prices, allows to focus on a representative firm omitting the subscript n. Eqs. (5), (3b)
and (6) give the equilibrium relative price values,
w
p
= (β
£
α−σl + (αkγ)
−σ¤1/σ| {z }
A
)−1 (7a)
pk
p
= (γβA)−1 (7b)
Capital disappears from the cost function (3b) that becomes
c(y) = Awy
Once we know the equilibrium prices we can determine produced quantity and profits. The
latter are defined as
π = py − c(y) = (p−Aw)y = β − 1
β
py (8)
When the time structure is not relevant, and markets are opened simultaneously, profit
is always positive, budget constraints do not bind, and all profits are distributed. As a
consequence,
r = π = py − c(y) (9a)
d ≡ 1
H
X
N
rn =
N
H
r =
N
H
(β − 1)
β
py (9b)
Aggregating over the H consumers, demand for the nth firm is
yd = Ha
³ p
P
´−b (w + d)
P
(10)
After substituting the expressions for w (eq. 7a), and d (eq. 9b), and with some algebra,
we obtain the equilibrium values of y and π
y =
aH
AN (β(1− a) + a)
(11)
π = p
β − 1
β
aH
AN (β(1− a) + a)
Aggregate labour supply, substituting the expressions for prices and y becomes
Ls =
aH
β(1− a) + a (12)
Finally, the demand functions for factors determine the quantity of capital and the division
of labour
k = α−σk p
σ−1
k
¡
α−σk p
σ
k + α
−σ
l w
σ
¢−σ−1σ y (13a)
ly = α−σl w
σ−1 ¡α−σk pσk + α−σl wσ¢−σ−1σ y (13b)
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that at equilibrium (after substituting the expressions for y, pk, and w) yield
k = α−σk γ
1−σA−σ
aH
N (β(1− a) + a)
(14)
ly = α
−σ
l A
−σ aH
N (β(1− a) + a)
As a coherence check, notice that N(lk + ly) = Ls.
The model just outlined is totally standard: relative prices, and equilibrium quantities are
determined exclusively by tastes and technology parameters. As we said, in the benchmark
case money only determines the absolute price level, and serves as a numeraire (as in the
classical Walrasian system). As long as prices are able to adjust in response to shocks, the
baseline economy will always and instantaneously return to equilibrium, once perturbed. In
the next section we will progressively introduce the hypotheses laid down in the introduction,
in order to see how this conclusion changes.
3 Temporary Equilibrium Expectations and Time to
Build
The hypotheses will be introduced in the following order: complementarity (ρ → −∞ in
the production function); temporary equilibrium; adaptive expectations; and finally time to
build.
3.1 Complementarity
Suppose capital and labour are complementary. The most extreme form of complementarity
is the Leontief production function
y = min[αlly, αkk] = lim
ρ→−∞
[(αlly)
ρ + (αkk)
ρ]1/ρ (15)
This has no eﬀect whatsoever on the model described in section 2, as price flexibility and
the contemporaneous opening of all markets allow equilibrium to be always immediately
established. Complementarity per se does not change the working of the model, as factors
can be freely allocated, and prices are flexible. It will play a role only later on, when time to
build and forecast errors will imply that some factors are fixed in the short run.
3.2 Temporary Equilibrium Structure
Here we introduce a first sequential element, borrowed from the temporary equilibrium lit-
erature (Clower, 1965; Malinvaud, 1977; Benassy, 1982), with an important diﬀerence to be
discussed below when we introduce expectations. Prices change between periods, and are
fixed when markets open and transactions take place. Thus, we have a fix-price (à la Hicks,
1956) model, and when plans are not realized equilibrium within the period is attained by
rationing.
In the labour market the wage changes in response to disequilibria in the previous period:
wt = wt−1
µ
1 + κ
Ldt−1 − Lst−1
Lst−1
¶
(16)
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Wage stickiness may be the consequence of many factors, ranging from union monopoly
power to eﬃciency wages, from market incompleteness, to fairness considerations4. We will
take this feature as given, and reflected in equation (16). The parameter κ ≥ 0 summarizes
the numerous institutional features that aﬀect the wage setting mechanism; it will turn out
to be crucial in the following pages.
To keep the structure of the model as simple as possible, we’ll assume that perfect com-
petition in the capital market continues to ensure the equality of price and marginal cost
through changes in pk,t = wt/γ; and that monopolists keep setting their prices following the
markup rule, pt = Aβwt. These admittedly strong assumptions imply that as long as tech-
nology does not change, relative prices are always constant and at their equilibrium value.
Hence, we are able to focus on absolute rather than relative price distortions5.
Holding relative prices constant, and focusing on representative consumers and firms, we
can write the model in “reduced” form, with wage as the only price variable, and in per
capita terms6:
ldt = A(y
s
t − ot−1) (17a)
yst = y
d
t (17b)
ydt =
a
βAwt
³
wt + (β − 1)Awt−1yt−1 + hft−1 + hht−1
´
(17c)
lst = 1−
1− a
wt
³
wt + (β − 1)Awt−1yt−1 + hft−1 + hht−1
´
(17d)
With respect to the benchmark, the only novelty is the appearance of stocks in the income
of households: If constrained by labour supply, firms cumulate undesired money balances
(hf), that they will distribute to households along with profit; otherwise unemployment u
appears. Likewise in the goods market o and hht are unsold stocks by firms, and undesired
money balances by households respectively:
hft = wtmax(0, l
d
t − lst ) ut = max(0, lst − ldt )/lst
(18)
hht = βAwtmax(0, y
d
t − yst ) ot = max(0, yst − ydt )
When there is no disequilibrium (and hence no stock accumulation), the equilibrium
quantities of the benchmark case emerge.
As prices do not change within the period, adjustment happens through rationing; the
short side of the market determines the amount exchanged. As a consequence, agents may
own undesired stocks of goods, that are carried over from one period to the other. We then
4Here, as in the Calvo pricing scheme commonly used by NK models, the reason why wages/prices do
not change is unexplained (it is simply due to ’institutional’ factors). The important diﬀerence with Calvo
pricing is that in the formulation I chose price setting is not forward looking.
The literature on causes and consequences of wage stickiness is enormous. For recent surveys of the theo-
retical and empirical research, the reader is referred to Campbell, and Kamlani (1997), Bewley, (1998), and
to Howitt’s, (2002) review of a book by Bewley (1999).
5This is diﬀerent from the following chapters, where relative prices may change. I plan to relax this feature
of the model in future research.
6In fact, all “per firm” variables are brought to “per consumer” terms, by multiplying them by N/H.
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have
lt = min(ldt , l
s
t )
(19)
yt = min(yst , y
d
t )
Real shocks. Thanks to the hypotheses on relative prices, real shocks do not aﬀect
this economy. Suppose for example that αk and/or αl increased, and as a consequence A
decreased to A0 < A; nothing prevents relative prices changes, so that
p0 = βA0w < βAw = p (20)
Labour supply and demand would be unchanged, whereas production would increase (see
eqs. 11 and 12).
Nominal shocks. We now introduce a nominal shock, namely an increase in money
supply at time t. Assume that this extra amount is helicopter-dropped to households, in the
form of money balances (so that hht > h
h
t−1 = 0). As is clear from equations (17) the increase
in monetary income causes an increase of demand for each of the goods, and a corresponding
decrease of labour supply. Firms adapt their desired quantities accordingly:
∆ydt =
a
βAwt
hht ∆l
s
t = −
1− a
wt
hht
(21)
∆yst = ∆y
d
t =
a
βAwt
hht ∆l
d
t = A∆y
s
t =
a
βwt
hht
If wages and prices were free to adapt, w and p would increase to the point at which the
extra money balances were absorbed. There would be no real eﬀects.
The unbalance on the labour market causes instead rationing, both in that market and
in the goods market:
ldt − lst > 0
(22)
ydt − yst > 0
Only from the following period w and p will increase, at a speed given by κ (eq. 16). Ma-
nipulation of the system (17) allows, together with the wage setting equation, to reduce the
system to
ldt+1 =
a
β
(1 +
wt
wt+1
¡
ldt (β + 1)− 2lst
¢
lst+1 = 1− (1− a)(1 +
wt
wt+1
¡
ldt (β + 1)− 2lst
¢
(23)
wt
wt+1
=
µ
1 + κ
ldt − lst
lst
¶−1
The system can be further reduced, by substituting the third equation into the first two, and
eliminating wt+1/wt. The steady state is found by imposing, ldt+1 = l
d
t , l
s
t+1 = l
s
t . This yields
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two solutions:
ls =
aκ
κ+ 1− a, l
d =
a (1 + κ)
β (κ+ 1− a)
(24)
ls = ld =
a
β(1− a) + a
In the appendix I show that the parameter κ can belong to 4 diﬀerent regions: (0, κml ],
(κml , κ
m
h ], (κ
m
h , κ
o
h]. For κ large enough, (between κ
m
l and κ
o
h, the second position (that co-
incides with the benchmark equilibrium) is reached; this can happen monotonically (κ ∈
(κml , κ
m
h ]), or with an oscillatory trajectory (κ ∈ (κol , κoh]). For small values of κ (κ ∈ (0, κml ])
the system converges to the “bad” equilibrium, in which changes in money balances and in
wages exactly oﬀset each other, so that labour supply and demand are constant at a dise-
quilibrium level. Finally, for values above κoh the variation of the wage is so wide that the
system diverges and sooner or later the economy implodes (some variable goes to 0).
To conclude, a temporary equilibrium structure prevents immediate jumps to the new
equilibrium position. Nevertheless, if prices change towards the absorption of disequilibrium,
and if they are not too sticky, the system eventually converges to the new equilibrium, as is
intuitive.
3.3 Adaptive vs Rational Expectations
Up to this point expectation formation has been left in the background. In fact this was
done for a reason, as the role of agents’ beliefs in the adjustment process described above
is marginal. If agents are fully rational, they embed in their decisions both the constraints
imposed by the wage setting mechanism, and the rationing following a disequilibrium. As a
consequence, the sequence of disequilibria following a shock is purely notional, in the sense
that actual demands and supply take into account the constraints, extra money balances
are released only gradually, and markets are always in equilibrium; the gradual wage change
induces the convergence of actual demand and supply to the equilibrium notional levels.
Such a behaviour is analogous, with the due diﬀerences, to that of standard temporary
equilibrium models (e.g. Benassy, 1982). If agents do not have fully rational expectations,
the diﬀerence between notional and actual quantities disappears, so that the adjustment
process is characterized by disequilibria and accumulation of stocks by rationed agents7.
The only significant diﬀerence between adaptive and rational behaviour is that as the
threshold values derived in the appendix depend on initial conditions, when facing extreme
values of κ (below κml or above κ
o
h) fully rational agents will be able to alter their initial
notional demand in order to change the thresholds and set the economy on a sustainable
path. But for most values of κ the diﬀerence between rational and adaptive behaviour is not
really more than a theoretical curiosum, as it has not eﬀect on the path followed by the
economy.
3.4 Time to Build
In the preceding paragraphs we showed that in general, adaptive behaviour and sticky prices
only yield temporary disequilibria following a shock. Here we introduce the last hypothesis -
7There are not many models in which disequilibria cause stock accumulation. The interesting exception
by Bignami et al (2003), allows for mistakes, actual disequilibria and rationing, even if in a diﬀerent context
with respect to this paper.
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time to build - and we will show that as the others, it alone does not aﬀect the behaviour of
the economy. To analyze the hypothesis on technology in isolation, we further assume perfect
foresight, so that for any variable x, Et{xt+1} = xt+1. To simplify the exposition, suppose
that the production function is a Cobb-Douglas (ρ = 0), and that the coeﬃcients are such
that αl = α and αk = (1−α). Capital has to be accumulated one period in advance, so that
yt = l
α
y,tk
1−α
t−1 (25)
Cost minimization yields conditional demands that are ’intertemporal’, in the sense that
they contain prices and quantities at t and t+ 1.
kt =
µ
pk,t
wt+1
α
1− α
¶−α
yt+1
(26)
ly,t+1 =
µ
pk,t
wt+1
α
1− α
¶1−α
yt+1
The corresponding cost function is
c(yt+1, wt+1, pk,t) =
³wt+1
α
´αµ pk,t
1− α
¶1−α
yt+1
(27)
=
³wt+1
α
´αµ wt
γ(1− α)
¶1−
yt+1
once we consider the equilibrium in the capital market (eqs. 6)
The steady state of this static economy is characterized by xt = xt+1 = x for each variable.
As a consequence, at the equilibrium the economy is like the benchmark (modified to take
into account the Cobb-Douglas hypotheses):
c(y,w) = α−α (γ(1− α))−(1−α)wy = Awy
(28)
w
p
=
³
βα−α (γ(1− α))−(1−α)
´−1
= (βA)−1
as in eqs. (7), with A = α−α (γ(1− α))−(1−α). As a consequence, y π and Ls can be
calculated as in eqs. (11-12):
y =
aH
AN (β(1− a) + a)
π = p
β − 1
β
aH
AN (β(1− a) + a) (29)
Ls =
aH
β(1− a) + a
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Factor demands in equilibrium are given by
k =
µ
1
γ
α
1− α
¶−α aH
AN (β(1− a) + a)
= γ(1− α) aH
N (β(1− a) + a)
(30)
ly =
µ
1
γ
α
1− α
¶1−α aH
AN (β(1− a) + a)
= α
aH
N (β(1− a) + a)
Obviously, nominal shocks do not aﬀect the equilibrium. Prices, free to adapt, would
jump to the new equilibrium level, and quantities would be unaﬀected. A real shock instead
causes a changes in quantities. Consider the same shock that will be analyzed in section
5.2 below, namely an increase in a. The new steady state position will be characterized by
higher labour supply and production (this can be checked by substituting a0 > a in eqs. 29).
Correspondingly, also capital and labour demand will increase (eq. 30).
Anticipated Shocks Suppose the shock happens at t+1. If it is perfectly anticipated,
demand for the factors will be
kt =
µ
wt
wt+1
¶−α γ(1− α)a0H
N (β(1− a0) + a0)
(31)
ly,t+1 =
µ
wt
wt+1
¶1−α αa0H
N (β(1− a0) + a0)
while given the inherited stock of capital ly,t is at its steady state value. Total labour demand
will be
N(lk,t + ly,t) = N
Ã
αaH
N (β(1− a) + a) +
1
γ
µ
wt
wt+1
¶−α γ(1− α)a0H
N (β(1− a0) + a0)
!
(32)
= H
Ã
αa
β(1− a) + a +
µ
wt
wt+1
¶−α
(1− α)a0
β(1− a0) + a0
!
whereas labour supply is
Lst = H
µ
1− (1− a)(wt + dt)
wt
¶
(33)
=
aH
β(1− a) + a
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so that the required wage change will be
wt
wt+1
=
Ã
a0
β(1−a0)+a0
a
β(1−a)+a
! 1
α
=
µ
Lst+1
Lst
¶ 1
α
> 1 (34)
where the inequality comes from the fact that a0 > a and α < 1.
Unanticipated Shocks If the shock is unanticipated, then the existing capital stock
constrains firms, that have to change labour demand accordingly:
ly,t =
³ yt
k¯1−α
´ 1
α
(35)
As a consequence, marginal cost and the price are
c0t =
wtk¯
α−1
α
α
y
1−α
α
t
(36)
p = βc0 = β
wtk¯
α−1
α
α
y
1−α
α
t
Notice that as capital is given in the short run, marginal cost is not any more independent of
y. Starting from demand (as in equation 10, and assuming that all firms are alike), we have
ydt =
Ha0
Np
(wt + dt)
(37)
=
Ha0
Np
µ
wt + wt−1
(β − 1) a
β(1− a) + a
¶
Substituting the price and solving for y we obtain labour demand in the goods sectors:
ydt =
Ã
Ha0αk¯
1−α
α
Nβ
µ
1 +
wt−1 (β − 1) a
wt(β(1− a) + a)
¶!α
(38)
Ly,t =
Ha0α
β
µ
1 +
wt−1 (β − 1) a
wt(β(1− a) + a)
¶
Notice that the stock of capital disappears from labour demand. We know that at+1 =
at = a0, so that wt+1 = wt (from eq. 34). Then,
Nkt =
γ(1− α)a0H
(β(1− a0) + a0)
(39)
Lk,t =
(1− α)a0H
(β(1− a0) + a0)
The equality of labour demand and supply gives
Lk,t + Ly,t = Lst = 1−
(1− a)
wt
µ
wt +
wt−1 (β − 1) a
β(1− a) + a
¶
⇒ (40)
wt−1
wt
=
a0(β(1− a) + a)
a(β(1− a0) + a0) =
βa0 + aa0(1− β)
aβ + aa0(1− β) > 1
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This section has progressively complicated the simple model presented in section 2. We
showed that neither complementarity nor quantity adjustment within the period, nor time to
build really aﬀect the basic message of the model, i.e. that prices change to absorb shocks.
We further argued that adaptive or rational expectations make no essential diﬀerence. None
of the hypotheses we laid down in the introduction, if taken in isolation, has significant eﬀects
on the benchmark model. At the very worst, as in the case of sticky prices, adjustment to
the new equilibrium that follows a shock takes some time. The next section will put all these
hypotheses together, and it will show that in that case these conclusions may drastically
change. We’ll be able to show that whether agents commit systematic mistakes or not, or
whether capital and labour are complements or substitutes, will crucially aﬀect the path
followed by the economy. We’ll also show that in such an economy some surprising results
about the desirability of wage flexibility may emerge.
4 The Sequence
The time to build hypothesis can be rephrased in more general terms with reference to the
CES:
yt = [(αlly,t)
ρ + (αkkt)
ρ]1/ρ
(41)
kt = it−1
where it−1 is investment in the previous period.
Assuming that markets open sequentially (credit, then labour, and finally goods), is a
simple way to introduce a cash in advance constraint: wages have to be paid before goods are
sold, and hence in disequilibrium firms may have a positive demand for external financing.8
Expectations Expectations may be backward looking, or take into account the steady
state properties of the system: at the beginning of period t entrepreneurs expect demand in
the following period, and unemployment in the current period, to be
y∗t+1|t = φ
¡
λy∗t|t−1 + (1− λ)ydt−1
¢
+ (1− φ) aH
AN (β(1− a) + a)
(42)
u∗t|t = φ
¡
λu∗t−1|t−1 + (1− λ)ut−1
¢
+ (1− φ)0
where φ is an indicator function taking value 1 if expectations are backward looking, and λ
denotes the (lack of) propensity to change expectations based on past experience.
Desired quantities Given wages, and via the markup (eq. 5) relative prices, firms
determine desired supply of goods, and desired investment (eq. 13a):
yˆst = a
µ
pt
Pt−1
¶−b H(1− u∗t|t)wt +Πt−1 +Hht−1
Pt−1
(43)
ıˆt = α−σk (γA)
1−σy∗t+1|t
8Notice that in the section above this sequential opening would have had no eﬀect at all. Cash in advance
constraints play a role only in disequilibrium.
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with hats denoting desired quantities9. Two important things are worth mentioning: the first
is that investment ıˆ incorporates the “time to build” assumption, in the sense that capital
has to be bought at time t for utilization at time t + 1. The second feature of eq. 43 is
that the monopolist takes into account all expected income, i.e. wage by employed workers,
aggregate profits distributed in the previous period (to all H households), and also, if any,
involuntary money hoardings (Hh =
P
H h
h) derived by rationing in the previous period.
Notice also that he takes the aggregate price level as given (at the last known level, Pt−1).
Desired production is determined subtracting from desired quantity unsold stocks carried
on from last period (ot−1), and taking into account the constraint of capital availability:
kˆt = α−σk (γA)
1−σ(yˆst − ot−1)
(44)
qˆt = (yˆst − ot−1)min(1,
kt
kˆt
)
In other words, after taking into account stocks, agents check whether the capital inherited
from last period is suﬃcient to carry on desired production; if it is not the case (kt < kˆt),
desired production has to be scaled down.
Labour demand is determined by the needs of the two sectors. In the capital sector,
perfect competition guarantees that supply matches desired demand, so that as said before,
investment is nothing but demand for “dated labour” (eq. 13b)
lˆy,t = A1−σα
−σ
l qˆt
(45)
lˆk,t = ıˆt/γ
Once we know labour demand, we may finally determine the desired wage fund, and the
consequent demand for money.
Cash-in-advance, budget constraints, and the market for credit In the baseline
model, contemporaneous opening of all markets, and the monopolistic competition structure,
guaranteed that the firm’s budget constraints was always satisfied. Once we develop the
sequential structure of the model, the cash-in-advance constraint may be binding, and it may
cause a positive demand for money. As we anticipated above, when the labour market opens
firms have to pay wages with all available cash, i.e. with revenues from previous periods, and
with external funds. The reason is that wages have to be paid in advance, and that as we’ll
see, outside the steady state internal funds may not be suﬃcient. Money demand may then
be written as the diﬀerence between the wage fund and internal resources.
F dt = wt(Lˆy,t + Lˆk,t)− (Rt−1 +H
f
t−1 −Πt−1) (46)
where R and Π are aggregate revenues and distributed profits respectively, and Hf denotes
involuntary monetary hoardings by firms (see eq. 51 below). Equation 46 embeds the cash-
in-advance constraint: the firm system needs additional funds for whatever of the wage pool
it cannot finance out of internal resources.10
9Notice that the unemployment rate reduces demand (via household income). This formulation is de facto
identical to the scaling down of demand due to constrained labour supply that I use in the appendix
10This model leaves the ambiguity of F (money or credit?) unresolved. In fact, money supply is simple
outside money (not repaid), whereas money demand is more like demand for credit (but for it to be credit,
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The behavior of monetary authorities not explicitly modeled. We simply assume that the
monetary policy authority follows a rule that weights money demand, inflation, and steady
state behaviour.
F st = µ[ξF
d
t + (1− ξ)F dt−1](1− ψ
wt − wt−1
wt−1
) + (1− µ)F st−1 (47)
The parameter µ gives the willingness to accommodate demand. ξ denotes the degree of
foresight of the central bank; with ξ = 1 we have perfect foresight, whereas ξ = 0 implies
that the central bank only observes demand with a lag. Finally, ψ denotes the weight given
to inflation. Broadly speaking, a “Friedman” rule would have µ = 0, while a “Taylor” rule
would imply positive ψ and µ.
Households’ demand and supply. On the household side, we have individual demand
for each of the goods and supply of labour (see eq. 2):
yˆdt =
a
H
µ
pt
Pt
¶−b Hwt +Πt−1 +Hht−1
Pt
(48)
lˆst = 1−
(1− a)
H
Hwt +Πt−1 +Ht−1
wt
4.1 Market outcome and rationing
Once the “notional demands” are formulated, the markets open sequentially. The first market
to open is the credit market, where we have
Ft = min(F dt , F
s
t ) (49)
If money demand is rationed, the entrepreneurs will not be able to demand all the labour
force they planned to hire, so that
Ldt =
min(F dt , F
s
t ) + (Rt−1 +H
f
t−1 −Πt−1)
wt
(50)
where Ldt ≡ Ly,t + Lk,t. We assume proportional rationing between the y and k markets. If
supply is rationed, we assume that the excess money is distributed to households (see below).
Notice that firms rationed by credit constraints, by scaling down labour demand to make it
consistent with financial availability, take into account monetary policy when forming their
demand in the other markets. Thanks to the fact that the financial market opens first, its
constraints are embedded in the agent’s plans similarly to the standard temporary equilibrium
literature.
we would need to keep track of repayments adding term like −(1 + r)Ft−1 in the budget constraint). The
reason why the ambiguity is not resolved is that here I am more interested in observing how money demand
emerges, and what are the eﬀects of liquidity constraints on investment and income. In future research I plan
to develop the financial market. An interesting attempt in this direction in a standard Hicksian setting is
contained in Attar and Campioni (2003).
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The second market to open is the labour market. Once again, eﬀective employment (and
consequently unemployment) is given by the short side rule
Lt = min(Ldt , L
s
t)
ut =
max(0, Lst − Ldt )
Lst
(51)
Hft = wtmax(0, L
d
t − Lst)
If constrained by labour supply, firms cumulate undesired money balances that they will
distribute to households together with profits. The total pool of employed workers produces
capital and goods:
qt = [(αlly,t)ρ + (αkk¯t)ρ]1/ρ
it = γlk,t (52)
yst = qt + ot−1
where k¯t = min(kˆt, kt), and lj,t = lˆj,t LtLˆdt
, with j = y, k, are the constrained quantities.
After equilibrium in the labour market is attained, wages are paid, and households form
their demand
ydt = a
µ
pt
Pt
¶−b H(1− ut)wt +Πt−1 +Hht−1 +max(F st − F dt , 0)
Pt
(53)
The final market to consider is the goods one, where we have
yt = min(yst , y
d
t )
Rt = Nptyt
(54)
ot = max(0, yst − ydt )
hht = ptmax(0, y
d
t − yst ) +
max(0, F st − F dt )
H
Notice that households carry stocks both because they were rationed in the goods market,
and because the excess supply of money was distributed to them.
This marks the end of the period. The economy enters the following period with a stock
of capital Kt+1 = Nit that will be available to firms for production. Other state variables
are the stocks of unsold goods (o), nondesired money balances (Hh), and profits distributed
to households (Πt = Rt +H
f
t − wtLt).
Stocks on one side enter into the decision process (via expectations); and on the other
contribute to shape the system of constraints faced by agents in the following period. This
is a crucial diﬀerence with respect to the temporary equilibrium literature, in which each
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period was de facto considered in isolation. Here the stocks carried from one period to the
other shape a sequence11 of periods that it is impossible to analyze separately.
The model outlined above has complex disequilibrium dynamics, that make an analytical
solution impossible to find. The next section will therefore rely on simulations to trace the
path followed by the economy.
5 The Simulations
This section presents some basic results of the sequential model I described. I will analyze
both nominal and real shocks, and describe how diﬀerent hypotheses (in particular regarding
wage regimes and monetary policy) aﬀect the final outcome of the disequilibrium path fol-
lowed by the economy. In all cases, the economy is initially in steady state, and is perturbed
by a shock that creates a disequilibrium in one or more markets.
The relevant parameters in the model are not many: the degree of substitutability be-
tween inputs (ρ); the responsiveness of wages to disequilibria in the labour market (κ); the
parameters governing expectations (φ and ξ); and finally, the monetary policy stance (µ and
ψ)12. A thorough analysis would nevertheless require too many cases to be analyzed, so
that I opted for some time series examples, complemented by a Monte Carlo investigation of
the parameter space. The parameter values are drawn randomly within the relevant range,
and the response of the economy to the shock is analyzed by looking at the final level of
production, and to its variance over the run.
5.1 Nominal Shocks
Suppose that at time t = 10 the stock of money increases by 10%. This extra money adds to
the nominal income of consumers, and will imply an increase in the demand for goods and
leisure. In the benchmark model, the instantaneous price adjustment would immediately
absorb the nominal excess demand, and quantities will be unaﬀected. Introduce now the
sequential structure described in section 4, but assume the absence of rigidities. The system
quickly goes back to equilibrium (figure 1). Production initially drops, because the increase
in leisure demand implies a shortage in labour supply. Notice that if production could take
place with capital built in the same period, then we would observe an increase of actual
production in the short run. But in this case, the labour shortage cannot be compensated by
the use of more capital (still to be built), even if the technology allows for the substitution.
In the following periods, the increase of wages triggered by the excess demand for labour
helps reabsorb the disequilibrium, and the nominal shock has no long term eﬀects.
Increasing the degree of complementarity (ρ→−∞) does not change the qualitative be-
haviour of the system, but makes the initial disequilibrium deeper, and the recovery longer,
as figure 2 shows, by comparing the deviation of supply from its steady state value in the
three cases of linear (ρ = 1), Cobb-Douglas (ρ = 0) and Leontief (ρ = −∞) technology.
The standard deviation of supply increases with complementarity, whereas the mean de-
creases. This result confirms and extends the findings of section 3.2: even with time to build
11“Via expectations, and in the attempt to correct the imbalances between demand and supply, a
‘constraints-decisions-constraints’ sequence sets in, that results in an out-of-equilibrium process” (Amendola
and Gaﬀard, 1998, p. 27).
12The other parameters are: αk = αl = 0.5, γ = 16, a = 0.7, b = 2 H = 1000, N = 10, λ = 0.5. All the
simulations where ran in FORTRAN. The code is available upon request.
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Figure 1: Nominal Shock. Linear technology (ρ = 1), flexible prices (κ = 0.5) accommodating
monetary policy (µ = 1) and perfect foresight (φ = 0, ξ = 1).
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Figure 2: Nominal Shock. Speed of convergence with diﬀerent levels of complementarity.
Flexible prices (κ = 0.5), accommodating monetary policy (µ = 1) and perfect foresight
(φ = 0, ξ = 1)
and complementarity, if agents do not form their expectations backward looking, shocks are
reabsorbed.
The next step is to introduce the hypothesis of backward looking behaviour. We assume
that agents form their expectations based on past demand behaviour (φ = 1 in eq. 42); and
that the monetary authority is only able to observe demand for credit with a lag (ξ = 0
in eq. 47). We are interested the behaviour of the economy under diﬀerent wage regimes
and monetary policy rules. In figure 3 I plotted the ratio of production over the steady
state value, under diﬀerent hypotheses on wage reactivity (κ = 0 or κ = 0.5) and monetary
policy stance (µ = 0 or µ = 1). These four extreme cases give some interesting insights:
first a shock, - even a positive and nominal one - triggers an adjustment process that sets
the economy on a permanently lower production level. The reason has to be found in the
diﬃculty to recover coordination, lost after the shock. In particular, the initial labour supply
shortage imposes a constraint on both investment and production decisions that, contrary
to the previous cases, now cumulates because of the interaction of production and decision
lags. The system settles on a new steady state with no involuntary unemployment, but lower
labour force participation (figure 4 depicts the case µ = 0 and κ = 0.5). On the other hand,
the excess of monetary means causes a permanent excess demand in the goods market that is
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Figure 3: Monetary policy and wage regimes. Nominal shock with perfect complementarity
(ρ = −∞) and backward looking behaviour (φ = 1, ξ = 0).
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Figure 4: Nominal shock. Goods and labour markets in the case of tight monetary policy
(µ = 0) and flexible wages (κ = 0.5).
never reabsorbed, as the driving force in the price movement is disequilibrium in the labour
market.
The second conclusion we can derive from the analysis of figure 3 is that wage flexibility
may play a positive role in the response to the shock, but that this role depends crucially on
the interaction with monetary policy. In fact, an accommodating monetary policy, coupled
with wage changes, may set the economy on an explosive path: agents react to wage changes
altering their investment and production behaviour, and consequently the demand for exter-
nal financing. If these fluctuations are excessive, a tight monetary policy may dampen them,
whereas by accommodating they may be further enhanced. However, ranking the four cases
by mean and standard deviation, we notice that money creation may partially do the job of
wage changes, so that if κ = 0 an accommodating monetary policy (µ = 1) results in a higher
mean and lower variance of output. Notice that in the analysis of section 3.2 there was no
room for monetary policy. The importance of credit is clearly linked to the sequential nature
of the model and to investment.
To summarize, the analysis of the time series gives some important insights. The first is
that the sequential structure of the economy does not matter per se, in the sense that well
informed agents, not facing credit constraints, are able to reabsorb a monetary shock pretty
rapidly. The loss of coordination entailed by shock is only temporary and the economy goes
back to the original steady state path.
The second result is that once we introduce intertemporal complementarities in the pro-
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duction process and backward looking behaviour, even a nominal shock has permanent eﬀects.
Coordination, if the system is suﬃciently flexible may be recovered; but, as a consequence of
the disequilibrium path taken by the economy, this will generally happen at a level of output
diﬀerent from the original one. The impossibility of instantaneous adjustment to changes in
the environment triggers a sequence of constrained decisions, and has permanent eﬀects on
the structure of the economy.
Finally, we showed that the interaction of monetary policy and wage regimes plays a
crucial role. Decisions by non fully rational agents entail mistakes that may cumulate; so
that if on one side some flexibility in wages and/or in credit creation is necessary in order to
allow the reabsorption of the shock, on the other side, if excessive, it may actually amplify
the eﬀects of bad decisions, and push the economy on unsustainable paths.
The next step is to verify whether the intuition that comes from the analysis of time
series is robust to changes in the parameters. I set up a Monte Carlo experiment consisting
in the random draw of nine parameters13, and in a run of the economy, recording the ratio
between final and initial supply, and the standard deviation of supply over the run. The
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Figure 5: Monte Carlo for nominal shocks. Final/steady state level (right) and standard
error (left) of production as a function of the wage regime and monetary policy stance.
parameters aﬀect the final outcome of each simulation in a strongly nonlinear way. In order
to sort out their eﬀect I regressed the two variables over the nine parameters including
powers and cross terms to account for nonlinearities. The full results of the regressions are
reported in the appendix. Here I’ll focus on the two parameters I am mainly interested in,
the wage regime κ and the monetary policy stance µ. Figure 5 reports the approximating
polynomials in µ and κ for s and for its standard error. It shows that increasing wage
flexibility has positive eﬀects both in terms of reduced variability (left panel) and final level
of production (right panel). But this is true only up to a point. For too high values of κ,
further increases of the wage reaction coeﬃcient increase volatility, and reduce the final level
of output (notice that when analyzing time series, the flexible wage case had κ = 0.5). This
conclusion is even more evident from the left panel of figure 6, where I plotted (the positive
values of) the derivative of the s surface with respect to changes in κ.. For values higher
than κ ' 0.6 the derivative is almost always negative, meaning that increasing flexibility
will lead to a lower final level of output. Notice finally that this is true for almost any level
of µ. The reason for this result is that when adjustment is not instantaneous (both in the
agent’s decision processes and in the technological structure), and actions are irreversible, a
13ρ ∈ [−35, 1), κ ∈ (0, 1), µ ∈ (0, 1), λ ∈ (0, 1), ξ ∈ (0, 1), φ ∈ {0, 1}, αk ∈ [0.1, 0.9] (with αl = 1 − αk),
N ∈ [2, 99], ψ ∈ (0, 1).
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Figure 6: Monte Carlo for nominal shocks. Derivative of final supply with respect to wage
regime (left) and monetary policy stance (right)
frictionless system may become extremely unstable, while what are generally seen as ‘market
imperfections’ contribute to smooth the eﬀects of actions based on wrong beliefs, and hence
help maintaining the system viable. In a world characterized by adaptive behaviours and
by a temporally articulated production structure, the conventional wisdom is reversed: some
degree of market imperfection may be a factor of stability of the system rather than an obstacle
on the way to fully optimal equilibria. I will return on this result when discussing Keynes’
view on unemployment.
For monetary policy the results are less clear-cut. The right panel of figure 6 shows
changes in s when µ changes, again cutting the figure at the zero level. The only clear
conclusion is that a more accommodating monetary policy (increasing µ) is more eﬀective
for low levels of κ, confirming what we said about some degree of substitutability between
flexibility given by the wage regime and by monetary policy.
To conclude, the systematic investigation over the parameter space confirms the conclu-
sions reached earlier, namely that some degree of wage flexibility is beneficial in recovering
equilibrium after a nominal shock hits the economy; and furthermore, that accommodating
monetary policy is desirable especially when wages cannot change to reabsorb the shock. The
Monte Carlo experiment gives an additional information, i.e. that excessive wage variability
may be harmful. We explained this result with the smoothing role that market imperfections
play in this model.
5.2 Real Shocks
In this section we consider a change of tastes; specifically, suppose that consumer switch
their preferences from leisure to the goods, increasing labour supply accordingly14. In section
3.2, lacking the intertemporal dimension real shocks had no eﬀects (relative prices are free
to adjust in this model). Here time to build induces some real eﬀects. Nevertheless, figure 7
shows that when no complementarities exist, and agents are perfectly informed, the shock is
almost immediately reabsorbed. As this was the case for nominal shocks as well (see figure
1), a first result is that in a perfectly smooth setting the nature of the shock is irrelevant,
and the system recovers coordination.
Comparing figure 8 with figure 3, on the other hand, we notice that the nature of the
shock becomes relevant once we introduce irreversibilities in the production process and in
14We assume that at time 10 the parameter a changes from 0.7 to 0.75.
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Figure 7: Real shock. Shift in preferences from leisure to goods demand. Linear technology
(ρ = 1), flexible prices (κ = 0.5) accommodating monetary policy (µ = 1) and perfect
foresight (φ = 0, ξ = 1).
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Figure 8: Monetary policy and wage regimes. Real shock with perfect complementarity
(ρ = −∞) and backward looking behaviour (φ = 1, ξ = 0).
technology. The most immediate consideration is that in the case of a real shock monetary
policy is crucial. The equilibrium position following a shift of preferences towards more of
the goods implies a higher level of production and hence of installed productive capacity.
This is why a tight monetary policy, by constraining investment, is detrimental, and pushes
the system on an explosive path. The role of wage flexibility is more controversial; on one
hand, it allows a faster recovery. On the other, it is characterized by higher variability, and
by a larger initial recession; this is even more clear in figure 9, that shows total supply and
unemployment in the two cases of fixed and flexible wages, with accommodating monetary
policy.
The next step is to verify the robustness of these results. The strategy for the investigation
of the parameter space is the same as in the section on nominal shocks, and the results are
reported in figure 10. The left panel shows that the standard error of aggregate supply is
increasing in κ, and decreasing in µ. This means that both more flexible wages and a tighter
monetary policy increase output variability. The right panel depicts the ratio between supply
at time t = 200 and the equilibrium level. The ratio is strongly increasing in µ, meaning that
a more accommodating monetary policy helps the system converge to the new equilibrium.
The eﬀect of larger κ on final supply is less evident.
The Monte Carlo analysis confirms that real shocks are faster reabsorbed when monetary
policy is accommodating, and the financial constraint does not play a role. At the same
time, more flexible wages do increase output variability, whereas the eﬀects on final output
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Figure 10: Monte Carlo for real shocks. Final/steady state level (right) and standard error
(left) of production as a function of the wage regime and monetary policy stance.
are only marginally positive15.
The analysis of nominal and real shocks has highlighted some interesting features of the
sequential economy described above. The interplay of reasonable assumptions (on technology,
and on price and expectation formation) produces results that seem robust to the parameter
specification. In particular, in such a framework both an accommodating monetary policy
(as a way of limiting financial constraints), and some degree of wage rigidity (as a way of
dampening fluctuations, once wages are not market clearing) appeared as crucial.
The next chapter will show how a sequential model similar in spirit to this one may
shed light on an empirical puzzle on technical progress and productivity growth (the so
called ‘productivity paradox’). The present chapter will instead be concluded by some notes
on Keynes’ discussion of unemployment and wage regimes, and on its relation with out-of-
equilibrium modelling.
15This is also determined by the length of the run (200 periods). If we had a shorter period, the eﬀect of
κ would be more evident, because recovery is faster with more flexible wages.
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6 Wage Flexibility and Disequilibrium Dynamics. The
General Theory Reconsidered
The scope of this section is to analyze Keynes’ arguments about wages and unemployment,
and to show that the sequential model presented in sections 2 and 4 oﬀers a suitable framework
for his analysis. In other words, this paper may be seen as a contribution to the literature
claiming that Keynes’ theory may not be reduced to a special (fix price and hence short
run) case of the Neoclassical model as claimed by the IS-LM approach. The IS-LM is an
equilibrium construct, in which markets are complete, and the price vector conveys all the
information necessary to fully coordinate agent’s decisions. In this framework, unemployment
can only stem from nominal rigidities in the relevant market, namely the one for labour.
Leijonhufvud (1968), is the first author to oppose the standard textbook interpretation of
Keynes, and to read the General Theory as an attempt to introduce problems of coordination
in the standard Walrasian framework. He argues that Keynes’ main innovation lies in the
method, which is the attempt to see unemployment as a disequilibrium phenomenon linked
to the adjustment process following an exogenous disturbance. Furthermore, “the Keynesian
[system] adjusts primarily by way of real income movements” (Leijonhufvud, 1968, p.51). The
main reason for this shift of focus from prices to quantities in the adjustment process lies in
the refusal of the costless role of the auctioneer. Price adjustments require information that
is costly and lengthy to acquire. This implies that adjustment is not instantaneous, so that
the Walrasian hypothesis of trade only happening at equilibrium prices has to be dropped.
The result of trading at disequilibrium prices is the appearance of constraints which hamper
the realization of agents’ plans16. Hence “Realized transaction quantities enter as arguments
of the excess demand function in addition to prices” (Leijonhufvud, 1968, p.56).
Coordination problems arise in particular in the market for savings and investment, where
agents with diﬀerent time horizons interact. “Financial markets are manifestly incapable of
providing for the consistency of long-term production and consumption plans” (Leijonhufvud,
1968, p. 276). The reason is that expected future values of the interest rate play a role even
more important than its current value, and may induce speculative behaviour. Trade then
takes place at a false price, at which ex ante savings and investment are not equated. It
is therefore income that has to change in order to restore this equality. The conclusion,
according to Leijonhufvud, is obvious: “It was Keynes’ position that it is the failure of
the incomplete market mechanism to reconcile the implied values of forward demand and
supplies [...] that is the source of the trouble. Unemployment of labor and other resources is
a derivative phenomenon” (1968, p. 276).
If the ‘source of the trouble’ does not lie in the labour market, whose disequilibrium is only
a ‘derivative phenomenon’, the hypothesis of fixed wages that stirred so much controversy
acquires a very precise meaning. Keynes writes that “if money-wages were to fall without
limit whenever there was a tendency for less than full employment, [...] there would be no
resting place below full employment until either the rate of interest was incapable of falling
further, or wages were zero. In fact, we must have some factor, the value of which in terms of
money is, if not fixed, at least sticky, to give us any stability of values in a monetary system”
(Keynes, 1936, p. 303). Keynes reverses the common wisdom on wage rigidity, that in his
16The realization of the agent’s plans is actually constrained by the trades that they are able to do and by the
sequence of sales and purchases. Clower (1965) introduced the distinction between ‘notional’ and ‘eﬀective’
demand, that only coincide when trade happens at equilibrium prices. Out of equilibrium the standard
budget constraint of consumers is replaced by a liquidity (later known as cash-in-advance) constraint, and
by an income constraint.
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framework becomes a necessary institutional feature to avoid the implosion of the system
rather than a source of disequilibrium.
Leijonhufvud’s interpretation of the General Theory subtracts it to the fate of a spe-
cial case of the Walrasian model. Furthermore, it underlines the attempt to bring to the
foreground the problems that (the lack of) coordination poses. This intuition, dynamic in
nature, is nevertheless constrained by the choice of an equilibrium framework, and has hence
to rely on the persistence of ‘wrong’ prices to explain unemployment17. And this has con-
tributed weakening the argument; after all, what would prevent, in the medium-to-long run,
the creation of a new market able to coordinate investment and consumption decisions? Or
the design of some institutional mechanism able to lift the economy from a low activity
equilibrium?
The focus of this paper on disequilibrium dynamics allows instead to highlight two features
of trading at disequilibrium prices that are mentioned but not developed by Keynes and
Leijonhufvud: the appearance of constraints that at each moment in time aﬀect the agent’s
plans, and the sequence of suboptimal choices triggered by these constraints. Figures 11
and 12 show how, in my model, a shock may trigger a cumulative deflationary process, as
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Figure 11: Increase in Λ with fixed wages (κ = 0). Perfect complementarity (ρ = −∞),
accommodating monetary policy (µ = 1), and backward looking behaviour (φ = 1, ξ = 0).
originally argued by Keynes. The system is now perturbed increasing by 5% the number of
workers (an increase of H). Unemployment could be reabsorbed by increasing productive
capacity and employment to the new equilibrium level, and in fact this is what happens in the
standard case. On the other hand, with complementarity in technology, and irreversibilities
in the decision and production process, the shock has permanent eﬀects. Figure 11 shows
that with fixed wages unemployment is not reabsorbed, even when the financial constraint
is not binding (µ = 1). The complementarity between capital and labour in the production
process constrains agents’ choices, and production only increases with one period lag. The
loss of coordination implies that wage payment is not synchronized with production and
goods availability, so that when workers are paid (during construction) they find themselves
with undesired money balances; and the following period, when production is available we
observe excess supply and unsold stocks, that are put back on the market in the following
17The intuition that the right framework for this discussion is dynamic has kept reappearing. Drèze has
recently tackled the issue within a general equilibrium model with rationing, concluding that “it is not obvious
at all that price or wage adjustments susceptible of removing ineﬃciencies caused by price distortions would
also operate in the right direction, or with any eﬀectiveness, to circumvent coordination failures...[the heart of
the problem is ] ...the movement from one supply-constrained equilibrium to another as a topic in dynamics,
inviting the study of adjustment processes defined over prices (...), quantities, price expectations and plans”
(1997, p.1753). Similar points are made by Stiglitz (1999) and Tobin (1993) as well.
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period. The system settles down to an underemployment equilibrium, in which production,
and consequently the wage bill and demand, are low, and unemployment remains constant.
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Figure 12: Increase in H with flexible wages (κ = 0.5). Perfect complementarity (ρ = −∞),
accommodating monetary policy (µ = 1), and backward looking behaviour (φ = 1, ξ = 0).
Figure 12 shows furthermore that allowing for wage variability does not help reabsorb
unemployment. Rather, as argued by Keynes, it sets the system on a fluctuating, explosive
path. The reason is that wage decreases reduce the wage bill, and hence total demand.
Production keeps following with a lag, so that at each period more and more stocks cumulate,
and the system explodes.
Notice an important point here. In this model relative prices (the real wage) are constant,
and at the equilibrium value (given by technology alone, see eq. 7) so that in principle the
purchasing power does not change, and the eﬀect described by Keynes should not take place.
What in fact determined the implosion of figure 12 is the lack of intertemporal coordination,
further aggravated by wage changes. In the following chapters, when we’ll allow for real
wages to change, these eﬀects will be even more evident. But it is worth noticing that when
the system lacks intertemporal coordination, changes in nominal wages may be harmful even
when real wages take their equilibrium value18.
The model presented in this paper proves to be an useful tool for analyzing transitions
between equilibria in economies characterized by irreversibilities and complementarities. In
many respects it gives insights that are similar to those of standard Hicksian constructs, as
the ones used in the following chapters; as such, it constitutes a bridge between that stream
of literature and more standard macroeconomic models.
In this paper the model was shown to be useful for reframing the theoretical debate
on wage flexibility that followed the publication of the General Theory. The focus on the
properties of transitions, and on the conditions to be met for guaranteeing their viability,
allow to use it to investigate empirical puzzles, as in the next chapter, or more in general to
propose a diﬀerent perspective on economic policy (Amendola and Gaﬀard, 1998).
Further research along these lines should investigate the consequences of releasing the
price setting mechanism, for example allowing variable mark-ups, and consequently changes
in real wages. A Further complication of the baseline model, that would most probably
have the eﬀect of smoothing fluctuations, is the introduction of stock management by firms,
that would work in the direction of at least partially releasing the constraints. It would
also be interesting the introduction of heterogeneity (in technology, in firm size, in consumer
preferences).
18Amendola, Gaﬀard and Saraceno (2004), develop the argument on real and nominal wage flexibility in
Keynes and in an Hicksian framework.
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Appendix
A Convergence to Equilibrium with Fixed Prices
This appendix shows how to derive the threshold values derived in section 3.2. As in the
text, let’s start with the case of an excess demand of labour and goods, derived for example
by nominal transfers. We need to show for what values of κ the economy converges, in the
sense that an increase of wages succeeds in absorbing the extra money balances. The system
17 is reproduced here, with minor diﬀerences.
lst =
a− (1− a)βAydt
a
⇒ ydt =
a(1− lst )
Aβ (1− a)
lst+1 = 1−
1− a
wt+1
¡
wt+1 + (β − 1)Awtyst + wt(ldt − lst ) + βAwt(ydt − yst )
¢
(55)
ydt = A
−1ldt
yst = A
−1lst
We can define
xt = ldt − lst = Aydt −
a− (1− a)βAydt
a
= Aydt
µ
a+ β (1− a)
a
¶
− 1 > 0 (56)
so that the steady state of the system is defined by x = 0. Labour supply may be rewritten
as
lst+1 = 1− (1− a)
µ
1 +
wt
wt+1
((β − 1)lst + (ldt − lst ) + βwt(ldt − lst )
¶
(57)
= 1− (1− a)
µ
1 +
wt
wt+1
Rt
¶
with Rt = ldt (1 + β)− 2lst
Monotone convergence requires two conditions: The first is that the absolute value of x
decreases over time; the second is that its values keeps the same sign along the path. In this
case, with the initial xt > 0, we have
a) :
xt+1
xt
=
=
a
βwt+1
¡
wt+1 + (β − 1)Awtyst + wt(ldt − lst ) + βAwt(ydt − yst )
¢ ³a+β(1−a)
a
´
− 1
Aydt
³
a+β(1−a)
a
´
− 1
< 1
(58)
b) : xt+1 ≥ 0
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Conditions a) + b) imply
a
a+ β (1− a) ≤
a
β
µ
1 +
wt
wt+1
¡
(ldt − lst ) + βAydt −Ayst
¢¶
< ldt (59)
Then, substituting the values for y and rearranging we obtain
a
a+ β (1− a) ≤
a
β
µ
1 +
wt
wt+1
Rt
¶
< ldt
The wage equation (16) gives
wt
wt+1
=
µ
1 + κ
ldt − lst
lst
¶−1
=
lst
lst + κ(l
d
t − lst )
so that
a
a(1− β) + β −
a
β
≤ a
β
µ
lstRt
lst + κ(l
d
t − lst )
¶
< ldt −
a
β
which after some algebra, for the two inequalities gives respectively (substituting back Rt)
κ > κml =
lst
ldt − lst
Ã
a
¡
ldt (1 + β)− 2lst
¢
βldt − a
− 1
!
Similarly, the condition b) gives the other extreme:
κ < κmh =
lst
ldt − lst
µ¡
(1 + β)ldt − 2lst
¢ a+ β (1− a)
a(β − 1) − 1
¶
To summarize, for values of κ ∈ (κml , κmh ), the system converges monotonically to the new
equilibrium. For values below κ∗ the gap diverges (
xt+1
xt
≥ 1) until it reaches what we called
the "bad" equilibrium. For values above κmh the variation of wages is such that the system
abandons the portion of the plane characterized by excess demand of labour. This does not
mean that it will diverge though, as it may well be the case that convergence is oscillatory.
Oscillatory convergence requires the following conditions:
a) :
−xt+1
xt
< 1 with xt > 0
b) :
−xt+1
xt
< 1 with xt < 0
In words, the absolute value of excess demand/supply must decrease, and the sign must
be diﬀerent at successive t0s. Regarding condition a) we have the same starting system that
we had for monotone convergence (system 55); but now condition b) of eqs 58 is of course
reversed. It is then of course obvious that
κol = κ
m
h =
lst
ldt − lst
µ¡
(1 + β)ldt − 2lst
¢ a+ β (1− a)
a(β − 1) − 1
¶
We only need to show that the oscillatory trajectory does not explode, i.e. that −xt+1 < xt :
Manipulations similar to those that have been carried out above yield
2
µ
a
a+ β (1− a)
¶
− a
β
µ
1 +
wt
wt+1
Rt
¶
< ldt
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that allows to derive κoh :
κ < κoh =
lst
ldt − lst
Ã
(a+ β (1− a)) a¡
2a− ldt (a+ β (1− a))
¢
β − (a+ β (1− a)) a
Rt − 1
!
The range over which κ allows the new equilibrium to be reached is hence κ ∈ (κml , κoh).
B Simulation Results
The following four tables report the complete results of the regressions that are behind figures
5, 6 and 10. To obtain the values in the tables, the following algorithm was followed19.
Starting from a set of regressors (the nine variables, plus their squares, with the exception of
the indicator φ), new variables were created (powers and cross products) sequentially. Each
new variable was regressed on the set of other regressors, and dropped if itsR2 was larger than
0.99 (this to avoid multicollinearity). Otherwise, it was added to the set of regressors, and ran
on the endogenous variable. If its Student t was larger than 2, it was kept, otherwise dropped.
Notice that this algorithm does not guarantee a ”path independent” selection of regressors,
because the order in which variables that may be collinear are extracted matters. This is why
that set of regressors was further altered by doing joint significance tests, and adding other
variables deemed significant; this arbitrary second round allowed to significantly increase the
R2 of the regression, or at least to keep it almost unchanged while reducing significantly the
number of regressors.
Notice finally that the benchmark value of production has in fact two diﬀerent meanings
when referring to nominal shocks (table 1), and when referring to real ones (table 3). In the
latter case, the shock alters the equilibrium values of labour supply and production, so that
yss 6= y0 is the new equilibrium value. In the case of nominal shocks, on the other hand, the
shock does not alter the fundamentals of the economy, so that the new equilibrium value of
production is the initial one.
19The algorithm was implemented in Eviews. The help of Giovanni Marini is gratefully aknowledged.
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Dependent Variable: y200/y0
Name Coeﬀ. t Name Coeﬀ. t Name Coeﬀ. t
C 0.782 76.8 κ3 ∗ µ4 13.7 3.5 κ4 ∗ φ -0.89 -3.1
ρ 0.000 3.5 κ2 ∗ µ -2.6 -3.7 κ3 ∗ φ 1.87 3.1
ρ2 -0.005 -6.2 κ2 ∗ µ2 11.5 4.4 κ2 ∗ φ -1.3 -3.1
ρ3 -0.011 -2.2 κ2 ∗ µ4 -8.3 -3.1 κ ∗ φ 0.33 3.0
κ 4.815 13.9 κ ∗ µ2 -1.2 -1.9 φ -0.02 -2.6
κ2 -51.8 -11.2 κ ∗ µ3 -1.2 -1.8 ψ 0.01 2.1
κ3 283.1 9.7 κ ∗ µ4 2.1 2.6 µ ∗ ξ 0.01 2.2
κ4 -862.9 -8.8 κ4 ∗ µ -3.6 -3.7 ξ ∗ ψ -0.01 -1.8
κ5 1536 8.1 κ4 ∗ µ2 10.5 4.8 κ3 ∗ ξ2 2.26 5.3
κ6 -1587 -7.7 κ4 ∗ µ4 -7 -3.7 κ3 ∗ ξ3 -1.9 -4.9
κ7 881.8 7.3 κ3 ∗ µ 6.05 3.7 κ2 ∗ ξ2 -3.2 -5.2
κ8 -203.4 -7.0 κ3 ∗ µ2 -20 -4.7 κ2 ∗ ξ3 2.7 4.8
µ 0.272 4.8 αk 0.00 1.8 κ ∗ ξ2 1.1 5.1
µ2 -1.421 -4.2 µ4 -3.01 -3.1 κ ∗ ξ3 -0.9 -4.8
µ3 3.180 3.7 µ5 1.02 2.6
R2 0.846
Adj.R2 0.841
obs 5064
Table 1: Coeﬃcients and Student t for nominal shocks (fig. 5)
Dependent Variable: s.e.(y)
Name Coeﬀ. t Name Coeﬀ. t Name Coeﬀ. t
C 1.468 23.0 κ3 ∗ µ4 -81.51 -4.7 ψ -0.033 -2.6
ρ 0.095 8.2 κ2 ∗ µ -14.53 -6.5 µ ∗ ξ -0.868 -5.2
ρ2 0.020 5.7 κ2 ∗ µ3 -28.06 -3.8 (µ ∗ ξ)2 0.395 2.7
ρ3 0.002 4.5 κ2 ∗ µ4 31.76 4.4 α2k 0.060 4.2
ρ4 0.000 3.9 κ ∗ µ 6.107 6.0 κ -26.9 -10.6
ρ5 0.000 3.5 κ ∗ µ2 -2.63 -2.1 κ2 327.3 9.4
ρ6 0.000 3.3 κ3 ∗ ξ2 -20.83 -6.6 κ3 -1933.7 -8.8
µ2 1.52 3.8 κ3 ∗ ξ3 18.17 6.2 κ4 6231 8.3
µ3 -1.4 -3.8 κ2 ∗ ξ -2.99 -2.1 κ5 -11571.6 -8.0
φ 0.142 5.0 κ2 ∗ ξ2 36.05 7.1 κ6 12349.1 7.7
κ4 ∗ µ3 -53.3 -5.2 κ2 ∗ ξ3 -29.76 -7.1 κ7 -7028.1 -7.5
κ4 ∗ µ4 49.9 4.6 κ ∗ ξ 2.490 2.2 κ8 1651.9 7.3
κ3 ∗ µ 9.19 6.0 κ ∗ ξ2 -14.63 -5.5 κ3 ∗ φ 0.377 6.3
κ3 ∗ µ3 83.4 5.2 κ ∗ ξ3 11.49 6.3 κ ∗ φ -0.424 -6.1
R2 0.791
Adj.R2 0.786
obs 5064
Table 2: Coeﬃcients and Student t for nominal shocks (figures 5 and 6)
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Dependent Variable: y200/ys.s.
Name Coeﬀ. t Name Coeﬀ. t Name Coeﬀ. t
C 0.423 18.3 ξ 0.040 5.6 κ4 ∗ µ 47.5 2.02
κ 2.610 59.4 φ 0.202 27.7 (κ ∗ µ)4 -114.8 -6.3
κ2 -12.590 -34.8 (κ ∗ ξ)3 0.227 5.1 κ4 ∗ µ2 -166.2 -3.5
κ3 83.501 24.2 (κ ∗ ξ)6 -0.308 -5.7 κ4 ∗ µ3 234.2 2.05
κ4 -275.1 -18.9 (φ ∗ µ)3 -0.027 -3.6 κ3 ∗ µ -116 -2.7
κ5 433.6 13.5 (ρ ∗ κ)5 -0.000 -3.3 κ3 ∗ µ2 412.1 2.06
κ6 -324.6 -9.4 κ ∗ φ -0.820 -34.2 κ ∗ µ -28.2 -17.2
κ7 93.2 3.08 κ ∗ ξ2 -0.116 -6.8 φ ∗ κ2 0.78 32.8
µ 0.960 38.8 λ2 ∗ φ -0.063 -2.6 φ ∗ λ 0.06 3.5
µ2 -16.06 -29.6 µ ∗ ξ ∗ ψ 0.065 5.3 φ ∗ µ 0.05 5.1
µ3 -9.99 -25.3 µ2 ∗ ξ 0.028 2.5 φ ∗ ξ 0.03 3.5
µ4 23.86 22.7 φ ∗ κ ∗ µ -0.028 -2.6 ψ ∗ µ2 -0.04 -3.6
µ5 -3.993 -16.2 φ ∗ κ ∗ ξ -0.098 -4.8 ψ2 ∗ µ 0.03 3.1
µ6 5.96 19.3 ρ ∗ κ -0.010 -7.6 ρ 0.007 8.7
κ ∗ µ2 100.1 12.8 ρ ∗ κ2 0.006 6.5 ρ2 0.000 4.5
κ3 ∗ µ4 286.8 3.04 ρ2 ∗ κ -0.000 -5.3 ρ3 0.000 2.9
(κ ∗ µ)3 -585.9 -4.1 ρ6 ∗ κ8 -0.000 -2.1 ρ4 0.000 2.2
κ ∗ µ3 -142.4 -17.8 κ ∗ µ4 68.8 3.3 ξ ∗ φ ∗ ψ -0.011 -2.2
(κ ∗ µ)2 -341.6 -2.5 κ2 ∗ µ4 -237.8 -6.5 ξ ∗ ψ2 -0.02 -3.8
κ2 ∗ µ 0.538 14.8 κ2 ∗ µ3 487.7 3.4 κ ∗ µ ∗ ξ -0.05 -2.2
R2 0.852
Adj.R2 0.851
obs 5603
Table 3: Coeﬃcients and Student t for real shocks (fig. 10)
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Dependent Variable: s.e.(y)
Name Coeﬀ. t Name Coeﬀ. t Name Coeﬀ. t
C 1.8431 35.2 φ ∗ µ 1.4070 1.9 φ ∗ κ ∗ µ -31.54 -7.4
κ 1.0436 22.8 φ ∗ µ3 -2.94 -2.67 (φ ∗ κ ∗ µ)2 107 6.2
κ2 0.779 16.1 φ ∗ µ2 3.788 1.76 κ ∗ µ ∗ ξ 2.56 4.4
κ3 0.000 11.7 φ ∗ κ ∗ ξ -2.205 -16.8 φ ∗ κ 133.2 12.5
κ4 -0.104 -10.7 φ ∗ λ -1.047 -4.2 φ ∗ κ2 -996.3 -8.4
κ10 -0.933 -8.39 φ ∗ λ3 0.902 7.1 φ ∗ κ4 -12405 -6.7
µ2 -0.246 -7.6 κ ∗ ξ 2.4875 6.3 µ ∗ λ -0.193 -2.8
µ3 -0.60 -6.4 (κ ∗ ξ)3 -2.043 -6.7 µ ∗ ξ -3.145 -8.5
µ8 -1.63 -5.0 (κ ∗ ξ)6 1.181 6.7 (µ ∗ ξ)3 1.698 8.0
ρ 0.2985 11.2 ξ -1.158 -4.7 κ ∗ µ 0.8429 8.9
ρ2 0.0559 9.3 ξ3 0.380 4.3 κ2 ∗ µ -0.399 -1.7
ρ3 0.0046 8.3 λ 0.1009 2.4 κ3 ∗ µ -1.5928 -3.8
ρ5 0.00 7.0 φ -9.781 -19.1 κ6 ∗ µ7 0.1940 4.1
ρ4 0.0002 7.5 ρ9 -0.00 -5.6
R2 0.8824
Adj.R2 0.8812
obs 5603
Table 4: Coeﬃcients and Student t for real shocks (fig. 10)
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